






































































































































































































































































































In this paper, we investigate a sample of 325 firms that decrease the number of segments they
report for the first time from 1979 to 1994. A key feature of our sample is that it permits us to
take into account the performance of segments in our analysis. We first investigate why firms are
in our sample. A firm can stop reporting a segment because it divests it as a whole, sells it off
piecemeal, discontinues its operations without asset sales, or restructures it (perhaps only to the
extent of changing its reporting) so that it is incorporated into another segment. We find that 168
firms in our sample divest the segment they stop reporting. We then investigate why some firms
in our sample divest a segment while others do not. Finally, we attempt to explain why a
particular segment is divested or no longer reported.
The empirical literature has examined three reasons for asset divestitures: (1) to have specific
assets operated by those who could operate them most efficiently (efficiency hypothesis); (2) to
make the firm operate more efficiently by reducing its degree of diversification (focusing
hypothesis); and (3) to relax credit constraints for the firm (financing hypothesis). These reasons
are not mutually inconsistent. The literature on divestitures has generally found a positive stock-
price reaction to the announcement of divestitures. In some papers, such as Hite, Owers, and
Rogers (1987), this positive stock-price reaction has been interpreted as evidence of the efficiency
hypothesis. More recent papers, starting with John and Ofek (1995), show that the stock-price
reaction is more positive for firms that divest assets not related to their core activities. These
papers attribute this effect to the benefit of increased corporate focus. Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz
(1994) find evidence that selling firms are poorly performing and financially constrained.
The hypotheses explaining asset divestitures in the literature have implications for firm and
segment performance prior to the divestiture and for the type of assets divested. The financing
hypothesis implies that firms that divest assets are financially constrained. The focusing
hypothesis predicts that divesting firms are poor diversifiers. To the extent that unrelated
diversification is inefficient, the focusing hypothesis predicts that firms divest unrelated
segments. The efficiency hypothesis does not have a strong prediction for firm performance,2
since a firm could have a segment that could be operated more efficiently by another firm even
though it is performing well. It does predict, however, that divested segments perform poorly
relative to their industry. Finally, the financing hypothesis implies that firms are more likely to
divest segments that drain their resources. We call sample firms that do not divest a segment
restructuring firms for simplicity, even though some of the firms only change their accounting.
We call segments no longer reported but not divested restructured segments. One would expect
restructuring firms to be poor performers that are under pressure to do better and stop reporting
one or more segments as part of an effort to improve their performance.
1
The firms in our sample are poor performers, invest less than their benchmark firms, and have
large diversification discounts. In  logit regressions predicting whether a diversified firm stops
reporting a segment, the diversification discount (calculated as in Berger and Ofek (1995)) and
Tobin's q are the only clearly significant variables. We find that divesting firms and restructuring
firms are remarkably similar, so that traditional firm performance measures do not distinguish
between these firms. This leaves us with a puzzle, namely why it is that among apparently similar
firms that stop reporting a segment, some firms divest and others do not.
We show that asset liquidity can help resolve this puzzle and that it helps in understanding
which segment a firm divests. As Shleifer and Vishny (1992) emphasize, the market for corporate
assets is like any other market. For a transaction to take place, there has to be a buyer and a seller.
If a firm wants to divest an asset, it has to find a buyer. If it is selling an asset in a liquid market,
the firm can sell the asset quickly at a price close to its "fundamental value" in the language of
Shleifer and Vishny. However, if the market for the asset is not liquid, the firm has to offer a
liquidity premium to attract a buyer. Selling the asset in an illiquid market may therefore yield a
price below the firm's reservation price, so that no sale takes place. Consequently, we would
expect firms in our sample to be more likely to divest a segment if the segment can be sold in a
liquid market.
                                                
1 See John, Lang, and Netter (1992) for an investigation of restructuring firms. Berger and Ofek (1999)
provide evidence of pressure from the market for corporate control on firms that are inefficient in their
diversification efforts.3
Shleifer and Vishny argue that in periods when an industry has difficulties, it is harder for
firms to sell assets to raise cash because the potential buyers who are best able to evaluate the
assets are themselves financially constrained. Pulvino (1998) provides supportive evidence. This
argument implies that diversified firms with core activities in poorly performing industries are
more likely to sell non-core assets.  This is because the bidders for core assets with the most
expertise would be other firms in the financially constrained industry.
The microstructure literature has investigated liquidity in financial markets extensively. It has
used bid-ask spread, market depth, and volume among measures of liquidity. Markets for
corporate assets do not have market makers who hold an inventory of corporate assets to facilitate
transactions, so that bid-ask spreads and market depth are not available for such markets. Shleifer
and Vishny argue that a high volume of transactions in an industry is evidence of high liquidity
since it means that discounts that sellers have to offer to attract buyers are less of an obstacle.
Consequently, we use the volume of transactions as a measure of liquidity. We construct an
industry liquidity index by taking the ratio of the value of corporate transactions (excluding the
segment divested) to the value of assets at the 2-digit SIC code level. While this is not a perfect
measure, its explanatory power is strong. In  logit regressions, segment liquidity is the only
variable that helps explain why some sample firms divest a segment while others do not.
If liquidity matters, it should also help predict which particular segment a firm divests. We
find that this is the case. A firm is more likely to divest a non-core segment than a core segment if
the firm's non-core segments are more liquid than its core segments. In regressions predicting
which segment a firm divests, the segment liquidity index has a significant positive coefficient.
The performance of the segment also matters: segments with poorer cash flow performance are
more likely to be divested. In our sample, however, industry-adjusted performance is less
important than absolute performance. This appears inconsistent with the efficiency hypothesis,
since poor industry-adjusted performance indicates that a segment could be more efficiently
managed outside the firm. The result is consistent with the financing hypothesis, however, since
segments with low cash flow aggravate the firm's financing constraints. Alternatively, it could be4
that a segment's performance relative to its industry is not indicative of efficiency gains that could
be achieved through a divestiture.
The probability that a segment will no longer be reported, either because of a divestiture or a
restructuring, is inversely related to the segment's size, measured as segment sales over firm sales.
Size could play an important role for three reasons.  First, a segment might no longer be reported
simply because it is too small to be covered by reporting requirements.  This explanation has
some validity, but it is incomplete because size seems more important in predicting which
segments get divested than in predicting which segments are restructured. Second, small
segments might be segments in which the firm has less of a comparative advantage. Maksimovic
and Philips (2000a) provide a theoretical model where this would be the case and find supportive
evidence in a contemporaneous paper using plant-level data (Maksimovic and Philips (2000b)).
Another possible explanation for the role of size is that, as argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1992),
the market for corporate assets is less liquid as size increases. We investigate these possible
explanations for the importance of size as a determinant of firms' choice of which segment to
divest. However, none of these explanations appears strong enough to explain the significance of
segment size.
The paper proceeds as follows. We introduce our sample in Section 2. In Section 3, we
show that firms in our sample are poor performers and that firms that divest rather than
restructure a segment are worse performers. In section 4, we compare divested, restructured, and
segments still reported, which we call retained segments. Section 5 concludes.
2. The sample
To investigate divestiture decisions, we start with a sample of firms that decrease the number
of reported industry segments in the period 1979-1994. For fiscal years ending after December
15, 1977, SFAS No. 14 requires that firms report information for segments that represent 10
percent or more of consolidated sales. The Business Information file of Compustat collects this
information. We use the Compustat Full-Coverage Industry Segment File (CISF) database,5
including the Research Tapes, to identify these firms.
2 We exclude firms that have either a
Compustat SIC or an Industry Segment Identification code (SID) between 6000 and 6999
(Financial Services Industry), 4900 and 4999 (Regulated Utilities).  We also exclude American
Depository Receipts.
We include firms with assets in excess of $100 million that decrease their number of
segments for the first time.   As reported by Hyland (1997), firms sometimes change their number
of segments without changing their activities. We therefore investigate each firm using LEXIS
NEXIS to identify firms where the decrease in the number of segments corresponds to an actual
transaction reported in the financial press.
3 We also search the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions
database for transactions involving our sample firms and check whether these transactions
correspond to segment divestitures. Our sample of segment divestitures includes all segments no
longer reported for which we find either a transaction in the SDC database or an announcement of
an actual transaction in the financial press. We call segments no longer reported but not divested
restructured segments. These criteria result in an initial sample of 325 firms with total assets in
excess of $100 million. Of these 325 firms, 168 divest segments and 157 restructure segments.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the final sample of 325 firms. The distribution of
segments no longer reported, restructured, and divested by year is shown in panel A of Table 1.
The highest number of segments no longer reported occurred in 1981 with 38 cases. There are
more events in the first half of the sample period than in the second half. Half of the restructuring
events have taken place by the end of 1983 while half of the divestitures have taken place by the
end of 1985. We would expect such an outcome since our sample includes only the first instance
where a firm reports fewer segments.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the decrease in the number of segments in year (0) relative to year
(-1). It shows that 267 firms decreased the number of segments by one, 46 firms by two, and 12
                                                
2 The Full-Coverage File consists of all companies that file 10-K’s with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
3 The following sources are used in LEXIS NEXIS: PR Newswire, The Financial Times, Reuters Financial
Service, The New York Times, The Chicago Tribune, Business Wire, and The Wall Street Journal.6
firms by three segments or more. The decrease in the number of segments does not correspond to
the number of segments that firms stop reporting. This is because, in a number of cases, firms that
restructure in year t stop reporting all their existing segments of year t-1. In this case, they report
either only one segment in year t or one segment fewer than they did at t-1, but all the segments
have a new name. As a result, 27 firms that had more than two segments before the restructuring
do not report any pre-existing segment after the restructuring. We find that firms that restructure a
segment stop reporting 382 segments, or 2.43 segments per firm. In contrast, firms that divest a
segment stop reporting 207 segments, or 1.23 segments per firm.
We used annual reports to investigate what happened to the restructured segments, namely
the segments no longer reported but not divested. We had annual reports available for 93 firms.
For these 93 firms, 38 annual reports were uninformative. Twelve firms indicated that they
changed their reporting. Ten firms discussed a restructuring that involved the merging of a
segment into another. Nineteen firms reported discontinued operations and sales of some assets,
while seven firms reported sales of assets without discontinuing operations. Finally, two firms
reported a spinoff. There is a possibility that some of the firms that report sales of assets and a
spinoff should not be in the restructuring sample but instead should be in the divesting sample.
However, we did not find a transaction corresponding to a segment divestiture for any of these
firms.  As a robustness check, we re-compute and re-estimate all our results without these firms.
Removing these firms from the restructuring sample does not change our results.
3. Characteristics of firms reducing the number of segments
3.1. Benchmark portfolios
 In this section, we examine whether firms that decrease their number of reported segments
are poor performers, are financially constrained, and are poor diversifiers. We also evaluate the
performance of firms that divest and firms that restructure. To investigate the performance and
financial condition of our sample firms, we compare firms in our sample to benchmark portfolios.7
Since we are trying to understand why firms decrease their number of reported segments, the
most natural comparison firms are firms that are diversified and do not decrease their number of
segments. Therefore, to find comparison firms, we construct portfolios consisting of a minimum
of five firms in the same annual sales decile
4 as the sample firm, with the same number of
segments as the sample firm in the year before it stops reporting a segment, and require that the
comparison firms do not divest segments during the year the sample firm stops reporting a
segment. For this comparison, we start with the 284 firms for which the necessary Compustat
data is available and compare as many sample and benchmark pairs as the data permit.
3.2. Size, growth, investment, and diversification efficiency
Table 2 compares median values of characteristics of sample firms and benchmark firms. The
use of medians is common when comparing firm characteristics to avoid having the result
dominated by a few observations. We indicate when results differ using means, but our
conclusions would be similar using means rather than medians. Sample firms are slightly smaller
than benchmark firms in terms of market value of equity. By construction, sample and benchmark
firms have similar sales. Sample firms are growing significantly more slowly than benchmark
firms. We find that asset growth, sales growth, capital expenditures growth, and cash flow growth
are all significantly lower for sample firms. The ratio of capital expenditures to total assets for
sample firms is slightly more than half that for benchmark firms. The fact that sample firms
invest so little compared to benchmark firms is consistent with these firms being more financially
constrained or having poorer investment opportunities. Sample firms have a significantly lower
Tobin's q when  proxied by the ratio of the firm's market value to the value of its assets. We
compute the diversification discount measure of Berger and Ofek (1995) and find that the sample
firms have a substantially larger diversification discount. We estimate the Rajan, Servaes, and
                                                
4 Size deciles are based on annual sales deciles of all firms listed on Compustat.8
Zingales (2000) diversity measure and find that it does not differ between sample firms and
benchmark firms. Consequently, our evidence supports the hypothesis that sample firms are
poorer performers and, despite lower leverage, appear to be more financially constrained than
benchmark firms.
3.3. Cash flow and financial condition
In the third part of Table 2, we also report measures of cash flow, cash to assets, leverage,
interest coverage, and dividend yield for sample firms and benchmark firms. Benchmark firms
are in much better financial condition than sample firms. Sample firms are less profitable than
comparison firms. In addition, the ratio of cash to assets of sample firms is half what it is for
benchmark firms. However, at the same time, the firms in our sample have less leverage than
benchmark firms. This result is surprising since in general sample firms appear to be financially
constrained relative to benchmark firms. The coverage ratio of our sample firms is lower, but not
significantly so, than the one of benchmark firms. Finally, sample firms have a significantly
lower dividend yield than benchmark firms.
3.4. Asset liquidity
Asset liquidity should help us understand whether sample firms divest or restructure
segments. Furthermore, asset liquidity should help us predict which segments get divested and
which are retained. However, while liquidity affects the conditions under which segments can be
sold, it is not the initial catalyst in the firm’s decision to stop reporting a segment. Consequently,
we have no predictions about how the asset liquidity of benchmark firms differs from the asset
liquidity of sample firms. At this point, we therefore report the liquidity measures in the last part
of Table 2 for completeness since we keep using them throughout the paper.
An asset market is more liquid if assets can be sold quickly without a discount. If the market
has more transactions taking place, it means that buyers and sellers are active in that market, so
that a potential seller can find buyers without having to discount the price as much. We therefore9
use the extent to which transactions take place for a type of corporate asset as our liquidity index.
We construct our segment liquidity measure by estimating a liquidity index at the two-digit SIC
code level each year. To construct this index, we first collect from the SDC Mergers and
Acquisitions database all corporate transactions at the two-digit SIC code level in each year.
Corporate control transactions include all disclosed and completed leverage buyouts, tender
offers, spinoffs, exchange offers, minority stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, and
privatizations. Buybacks (e.g., repurchases and self-tenders) are excluded from the sample. We
then take the ratio of the value of corporate control transactions in a year (excluding the
divestitures in our sample) divided by the total assets of firms in that two-digit SIC code for that
year to obtain the industry's liquidity index.
5 It is important to remove the divestitures in our
sample from the transactions used to compute the liquidity index since otherwise an industry
would have more liquidity just because of the divestitures from our sample. We only use the
liquidity index if it is between zero and one and if the industry has at least ten firms. Because of
these constraints, we are unable to obtain a liquidity index for 16 segments out of 753. We define
a firm's segment liquidity to be the asset weighted average of the liquidity index for the industries
of the firm's segments. Our results are qualitatively similar if we use the market value of firms
(defined as total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity) in the
denominator of the index rather than the sum of the book values of assets of firms. However,
liquidity measures based on book values are more appropriate because market values incorporate
anticipatory takeover premia.
Industries with many corporate control transactions have a high liquidity index. Though the
question of why an industry might have more corporate control transactions than another one is
an important one, we make no attempt to explain the level of corporate control transactions in this
                                                
5 We recognize that the SIC codes reported by Compustat will differ from those of SDC (Kahle and
Walkling, 1996).  We do not believe this materially affects our results.10
paper.
6 One reason for a high level of corporate transactions is that an industry suffered a shock
that makes it optimal for corporate assets to be rearranged within the industry. A situation where
many parties want to trade is one where liquidity is high. Yet, there is more to liquidity than
industry clustering. In particular, we constructed a liquidity index that attempts to measure
whether divesting a segment would represent a large transaction relative to the volume of
transactions in the industry. We therefore also used as the liquidity index the assets of the
segment divided by the sum of the value of the transactions in the industry as obtained from SDC.
This index yields qualitatively similar, but statistically weaker conclusions.
In the last part of Table 2, we first report the weighed average of the liquidity indices of the
firm’s segments, where the weights are the assets of the segments divided by the total assets of
the firm. We find that firms that stop reporting a segment have less liquid segments than
benchmark firms. If firms sell assets to raise funds, the weighted average of the liquidity indices
of the firm's segments is not the relevant measure of liquidity. A firm might have mostly illiquid
segments, but might also have one segment that is highly liquid. If it considers selling assets to
raise cash, it would be able to do so by selling the segment that is highly liquid and the financing
hypothesis would predict that it would sell that segment. Consequently, the liquidity index of the
most liquid segment of the firm is an important liquidity measure that we have to consider. We
call this measure the maximum liquidity index. We find that the maximum liquidity index is
lower for the firms that stop reporting a segment than for the benchmark firms. This means that
high liquidity does not cause firms to stop reporting segments. We would be surprised if it did. In
our analysis, liquidity facilitates disposition of an asset; it does not act as a motive for the
divestiture.
                                                
6 Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) document that corporate acquisitions are clustered in industries. Mulherin
and Boone (2000) confirm that this is true for the 1990s also, but surprisingly they show that there is an
insignificant negative correlation between the rate of acquisitions and the rate of divestitures across
industries. Industry shocks also play an important role in the model of Maksimovic and Philips (2000a).11
Many of the variables in Table 2 are correlated. Therefore, to better understand which
variables are important determinants of a firm’s decision to reduce the number of segments, we
estimate logit regressions where the dependent variable takes value one if the firm reduces the
number of segments and zero for benchmark firms. A typical regression is as follows (p-values in
parentheses):
Firm stops reporting  =
-5.368
(0.001)
+ 0.112 Cash flow/Assets
(0.906)
- 0.645 Capital Expenditures/Assets
(0.576)
- 0.487 Sales Growth
(0.231)
+ 0.412 Diversification discount
(0.018)
- 2.021 Firm Liquidity
(0.353)
In this regression, the diversification discount is the only significant variable. The regression is
consistent with the focusing hypothesis, in that better diversifiers are less likely to stop reporting
segments. The other coefficients are not significant. We estimated a number of specifications
where we added other firm characteristics to the regression. We find that Tobin's q has a negative
significant coefficient when added to the regression and that adding Tobin's  q makes the
diversification discount insignificant. However, Tobin's  q is highly correlated with the
diversification discount, so that this evidence is still consistent with the diversification discount
being an important determinant of the decision to stop reporting a segment. If we add the interest
coverage ratio to our regression, it has a p-value of 0.10 with a positive coefficient, so firms with
greater interest coverage ratio are more likely to stop reporting a segment. No other firm
characteristic that we added to the regression is significant.
3.5. Comparing divesting and restructuring firms
In Table 3 we split our sample, reporting differences between sample firms that restructure a
segment and those that divest. We find only two significant differences. First, firms that
restructure are significantly smaller than those that divest segments. Second, firms that divest12
have a significantly higher liquidity index than firms that restructure. With the financing
hypothesis of asset sales, one would expect firms to be more likely to sell segments with higher
liquidity since they have to discount these segments less and hence get more proceeds relative to
the fundamental value of these segments. As a result, one would expect the segment with the
highest liquidity to be more relevant to the divesting decision of such firms. The difference in the
medians is not statistically significant, while the difference in the means (not reported) is
significant.
In Table 4, we provide estimates of  logit regressions where the dependent variable takes
value one for firms that divest a segment and zero for firms that restructure. The explanatory
variables in the first regression are cash flow over sales, capital expenditures over sales, the
coverage ratio, and the diversification discount. No variable is significant. In other regressions not
reported here, we find that other firm characteristics are also unhelpful in understanding the
divestiture versus restructure decision. Thus, we are left with a puzzle: firms that divest appear
indistinguishable from those that restructure. To explore this puzzle, we turn to the role of asset
liquidity.
In regression (2) of Table 4, we add the liquidity index of the most liquid segment of the firm.
The greater the liquidity index of the most liquid segment, the more likely it is that a firm in our
sample divests a segment rather than restructures it. Liquidity is the only significant variable in
that regression. In other words, firm performance variables cannot convincingly explain why
some firms in our sample divest and others do not, while the liquidity variable does. The third
regression in the table uses a different proxy for liquidity, namely the liquidity index of the most
liquid segment of the firm. Again, we find that a firm is more likely to divest a segment if its most
liquid segment is more liquid. Liquidity can therefore explain what firm characteristics such as
cash flow, capital expenditures, diversification discount, leverage cannot, namely why some firms
in our sample divest a segment while others do not.13
4. Which segments are no longer reported?
The focusing hypothesis implies that unrelated segments are more likely to be divested
because such segments reduce firm efficiency. The efficiency hypothesis predicts that segments
that perform poorly relative to their industry are more likely to be divested. The financing
hypothesis implies that low cash flow segments are more likely to be divested because they drain
resources of credit-constrained firms. In this section, we first compare the characteristics of
segments that are no longer reported to those of retained segments. Next, we compare
performance and liquidity variables for divested, restructured, and retained segments.  Logit
regressions are then used to evaluate the importance of these variables in the divestiture decision.
We conclude the section by showing that segment liquidity is helpful to understand whether a
firm divests a core segment or an unrelated segment.
4.1. Segments no longer reported versus retained segments
By definition, firms restructuring or divesting some segments are retaining others. Table 5
compares the median values of restructured and divested segments to those retained. Looking  at
the divested segments, it is immediately clear that divested segments are smaller segments than
retained segments. We find that divested segments are less efficient and have poorer growth
opportunities. In particular, for firms that divest, the sales and assets of divested segments grow
more slowly than those of retained segments. Divested segments also are less profitable, have
lower capital expenditures, and have lower growth opportunities. Finally, as we would expect, the
liquidity index of segments divested is significantly higher than the liquidity index of segments
retained by firms that divest segments. When we turn to firms in our sample that restructure
segments, we find that the segments restructured are smaller than the segments retained by these
firms, grow less, and have lower cash flow. The liquidity index of segments restructured is not
significantly different from the liquidity index of segments retained by firms that restructure.14
Comparing segments divested to segments restructured, we find few significant differences.
However, segments restructured are larger as a fraction of total sales than segments divested, are
more profitable, and have higher capital expenditure growth. As our arguments imply, divested
segments have a higher liquidity index than segments restructured. Specifically, non-core
segments divested have a higher liquidity index than non-core segments restructured. Comparing
segments retained between firms that divest and firms that restructure, we find that the only
significant difference between these segments is that the retained segments of firms that
restructure have worse growth opportunities than the retained segments of firms that divest.
Firms have to report segments whose sales exceed 10% of total sales. Thus, small segments
might be no longer reported simply because their sales fall below 10% of total sales. We find that
although many segments no longer reported have sales below 10%, segments divested are more
likely to have sales below 10% than segments restructured (i.e., no longer reported but not
divested). For the firms that divest segments, 46.9% of the segments divested have sales of less
than 10% of firm total sales. In contrast, only 19.9% of segments retained by these firms have
sales of less than 10% of firm total sales. For the firms that restructure segments, 36.4% of
segments no longer reported have sales below 10% and 22.5% of segments still reported have
sales below 10%.
4.2. Industry-adjusted comparisons
The efficiency hypothesis predicts that divested segments are inefficient relative to their
industry. In Table 6, we provide industry-adjusted comparisons of segments no longer reported
with segments retained. The table reveals that segments divested perform poorly relative to their
industry. Segments divested have negative capital expenditures growth before being divested and
negative sales growth compared to their industry. In contrast, restructured segments have higher
cash flow than their industry. However, they invest less than the industry and their sales growth is
lower than the industry. The evidence on capital expenditures is consistent with the hypothesis15
that the firms in our sample are financially constrained. When we compare segments divested to
segments restructured, segments divested have lower cash flow and invest less.
The segments retained in Table 6 have higher cash flow than their industry whether the firm
divests a segment or restructures it. However, the segments retained invest less than their
industry, which is again consistent with the hypothesis that firms that stop reporting segments are
financially constrained. Finally, retained segments have lower sales growth than their industry.
Industry-adjusted characteristics of the retained segments of divesting firms are not different from
the industry-adjusted characteristics of the retained segments of restructuring firms. This is
consistent with the lack of differences between these firms that we have emphasized.
4.3. Relative ranking of divested, restructured and retained segments
Stein (1997) argues that an advantage of internal capital markets is that they can better
allocate resources by ranking performance across divisions. This suggests that firms might choose
to divest segments that perform poorly relative to other segments within the firm. We therefore
investigate whether firms keep the best segments and stop reporting the worst. In table 7, we
examine how the relative ranking of these segments within the firm is associated with
restructuring or divestiture. To construct the table, we rank segments according to the various
characteristics. We then compare these rankings to the likelihood of the segment being divested
or restructured.  Consider, for example, all firms with five segments and then rank the segments
within each firm according to liquidity.  If liquidity doesn’t matter for the divestiture or
restructuring decision, we would expect 20% of the segment divestitures or restructurings to
occur in each of the five segment ranks. We use a Pearson Chi-square statistic to test for an equal
distribution of divestiture (restructuring) cases across the segment ranks. We then report in the
table the number of segments no longer reported for each rank for each characteristic. The first
characteristic we consider is the cash flow performance of the segment. We find that 49 out of
124 (40%) segments divested have the lowest cash flow performance in their firm. At the same16
time, however, 20 divested segments have the best cash flow performance in their firm.
Strikingly, 66 divested segments are the smallest in their firm, but only seven are the largest. A
segment is more likely to be divested because it is small rather than because it performs poorly.
More divested segments have the highest industry q among firm segments (41) than the lowest q
(33). The fact that the number with the highest or lowest rank of q are close together suggests that
segment growth opportunities measured by the industry  q  of single segment firms in their
industry is not important to the divestiture decision. However, among divested segments, 51%
have the highest liquidity index in the firm and only 12% have the lowest liquidity index.
From all this, it is clear that a segment's size, liquidity, cash flow, and relatedness to the firm's
core activities affect its probability of divestiture. Using a Pearson chi-square test we can reject at
the 10% level or better the equality of the variation across ranks for cash flow over sales, sales,
and liquidity for the divestitures. The largest segment and the most illiquid segment are highly
unlikely to be divested. When we turn to the retained segments of divesting firms, rankings still
matter but are less important. In particular, while 55% of the segments divested are the smallest in
their firm, 29% of the segments restructured are the smallest in their firm. Further, 40% of
restructured segments have the highest liquidity index in their firm, while 19% have the lowest.
4.4. Logit analysis predicting divested and restructured segments
Given that divested segments are smaller, are more liquid, and have lower cash flow than
other segments in their firm, we investigate whether each one of these variables is important or
whether some are important because they are correlated with other variables. In Table 8, we
report logit regressions for the probability that a segment is divested or restructured rather than
retained.  We first use a segment's cash flow, its size, its capital expenditures, its industry  q,
whether it is a core segment, and its liquidity index as independent variables. The dependent
variable is set to one for divested or restructured segments and equal to zero for retained
segments. In regression (1D), we find that a segment is more likely to be divested if its cash flow17
is low, if it is a small segment, if it is a non-core segment, and if its liquidity index is high. The
significance for non-core segment dummy variable is consistent with firms finding unrelated
diversification costly and is therefore supportive of the focusing hypothesis. The cash flow result
is consistent with the financing hypothesis. Regression (1R) is the same as regression (1D), but it
examines the probability that a segment will be restructured but not divested. The only significant
variables are a segment's relative size and its capital expenditures. Smaller segments and
segments with lower capital expenditures are more likely to be restructured than retained. Since a
restructured segment is not sold, one would not expect its liquidity index to matter. The fact that
the segment liquidity index plays no role for whether a segment is restructured or retained is
therefore supportive of the hypothesis that a segment's liquidity plays an important role in the
divestiture decision.
A segment with low cash flow can be divested for two separate reasons. One reason, provided
by the efficiency hypothesis discussed in the introduction, is that the firm is unsuccessful at
operating the segment efficiently. A second reason, coming from the financing hypothesis, is that
the segment is consuming corporate resources because its cash flow is too low and, as a result, a
financially constrained firm is better off without the segment. The efficiency argument implies
that a segment is more likely to be divested when industry median cash flow is higher since this
means that the performance of the segment is poor relative to its industry. In regression (2D), we
test this hypothesis by adding industry median cash flow to regression (1D) as well as industry
median capital expenditures. We find that the industry medians have insignificant coefficients. As
a result, performance relative to the industry does not seem to be an important determinant of the
divestiture decision. In regression (2R), we estimate regression (2D) for restructured segments.
The results are similar to regression (1R), except that median industry capital expenditures are
significantly negative. In other words, a firm is less likely to stop reporting a segment from an
industry with a high capital expenditures rate. One might think that this is because segments with
high growth opportunities are less likely to be restructured, but industry q is never significant.18
Our evidence shows that a segment's probability of being divested or restructured does not seem
to depend on its performance relative to its industry. This evidence is more consistent with the
financing hypothesis than with the efficiency hypothesis.
To this point, the importance of segment size is surprising. One possibility is that the effect of
size is due to segments that are below 10% of sales, so that the firm would no longer have to
report them. In regressions (3D) and (3R), we add a dummy variable for segments smaller than
10% of firm sales. This dummy variable is significant in the regression for segments no longer
reported but not in the regression for segment divested. A second possibility is that size matters
for the divested segments because liquidity is related to size. We construct another liquidity index
based on size. To construct this index, we divide up transactions across all industries into size
deciles. We then assign an index value to each decile by dividing the value of transactions in a
decile by the total value of transactions across deciles. However, whether we use the liquidity
index based on size, a liquidity index based on industry, or both, firm size is still significant. A
final possibility is that small segments have large influence costs, so that they get divested when
firms face pressure to improve their performance. Some models (see, in particular, Meyer,
Milgrom, and Roberts (1990) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000)) are consistent with the hypothesis
that small segments draw rents in diversified firms. These models might make it possible to
explain the importance of segment size in the divestiture decision.
4.5. Core versus non-core segments
Strikingly, 78% of the segments no longer reported by firms that do not divest are in the same
two-digit SIC code as the firm, while only 43% of the segments divested are. One is tempted to
conclude from the fact that divesting firms are more likely to divest non-core segments that firms
in our sample have decided to focus. However, the arguments of  Shleifer and  Vishny (1992)
imply that the most liquid segments of firms that divest segments to raise funds are more likely to
be non-core segments than core segments. If firms that divest segments are firms whose core
business is performing poorly and if this poor performance is the result of an industry effect, the19
bidders who would be best equipped to operate a core segment are financially constrained as well
and hence will not be the highest bidders. We find that for divesting firms the highest liquidity
segment among non-core segments has a significantly higher liquidity index than the highest
liquidity segments among core segments. This is not the case for the restructuring sample. The
importance of liquidity is again apparent: Among firms that divest segments, the greater liquidity
of non-core segments raises the possibility that the firm divests a non-core segment not because it
wants to focus but because it is the segment that can be sold most advantageously.
To investigate further whether differences in liquidity between core and non-core segments
explain why some firms divest core segments and others divest non-core segments, we estimate a
logit regression. The dependent variable takes value one if the firm divests a core segment and
zero otherwise. The focusing argument for why firms divest non-core segments is that they are
inefficient diversifiers. We proxy for the extent to which a diversified firm is efficient by the
diversification discount. The efficiency hypothesis predicts that a firm is more likely to divest
segments that underperform their industry. We therefore include in the regression the difference
between the weighted average of industry–adjusted cash flow for core segments and non-core
segments. The efficiency hypothesis predicts the probability of divesting non-core segments
increases with this difference. Finally, the liquidity argument implies that a firm is more likely to
divest a non-core segment if the liquidity of the non-core segment with the highest liquidity is
higher. We therefore use as independent variables the liquidity index of the core (non-core)
segment with the highest liquidity index defined as Max Core (Max Non-Core).
The regression estimates are as follows (p-values in parenthesis):
Divest core segment =
-1.056
(0.072)
+  24.186 Max Core
(0.043)




+ 3.47 Industry-adjusted cash flow difference
(0.484)20
Segment liquidity is a significant determinant of whether a firm divests core or non-core
segments. The diversification discount and cash flow performance measures have no explanatory
power in explaining why a firm divests core or non-core segments. These results are inconsistent
with the view that firms shed non-core segments because they are poor diversifiers. However, the
sign of the coefficient for the diversification discount is negative as one would expect with the
focusing hypothesis. We estimate the same regression for segments no longer reported but not
divested. No coefficient is significant in that regression.
These regression estimates provide limited support for explanations of divestitures that rely
on firms discovering that diversification is costly for them. In the regressions of Table 8, we find
that firms were more likely to divest non-core segments and here the intercept of the regression
has the same interpretation. However, specific measures of diversification costs cannot explain
this result. We also investigate whether a firm is more likely to divest segments whose divestiture
would reduce the Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) diversity measure the most using the
regressions of Table 8. We find that the change in the diversity measure that would result from
divesting a particular segment is never significant.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the determinants of a firm's decision to stop reporting a
segment and to divest it. We find that firms that stop reporting a segment are poor performers that
underinvest relative to benchmark firms and have a significantly larger diversification discount
than benchmark firms. In a logit regression, the diversification discount and Tobin's q are the only
clearly significant variables in explaining why some diversified firms stop reporting a segment
and others do not. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that firms that divest segments
are unsuccessful diversifiers. The performance evidence and the evidence on cash holdings is
consistent with our sample firms being financially constrained, (although our firms do have less
leverage than benchmark firms). Segment size is also an important determinant of the divestiture21
decision: A small segment is more likely to be divested regardless of performance. We explore a
number of reasons for why small segments are more likely to be divested, but this issue remains a
puzzle. In contrast, a segment's growth opportunities are irrelevant to the divestiture decision in
our sample.
Using traditional firm performance measures, we find that firms that stop reporting a segment
are remarkably similar whether they divest that segment or not. To explain the puzzle of why
some sample firms divest a segment while others do not, we resort to differences across firms in
asset liquidity. We show that controlling for firm performance, a firm in our sample is more likely
to divest a segment if its segments are in industries with a larger volume of corporate transactions
relative to industry assets. This is consistent with the analysis of Shleifer and Vishny (1992). As
expected from the theoretical analysis, part of the reason firms divest unrelated segments is that
they tend to be more liquid. All these results are highly supportive of the hypothesis that segment
liquidity plays an important role in firms' decisions to divest segments. Our evidence therefore
shows that in evaluating the performance and strategies of a firm, it is essential to take into
account the liquidity of the markets for the firm's assets. A firm might retain segments it would
otherwise divest if markets for corporate assets were perfectly liquid and yet its management
might be maximizing the wealth of its shareholders.22
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Table 1
Sample Breakdown
Our sample consists of all firms identified by the Compustat Business Information file as reporting a
decrease in the number of segments over the period 1979-94. We exclude American Depository Receipts
and firms that have either a Compustat SIC or an Industry Segment Identification code (SID) between 6000
and 6999 (Financial Services Industry), 4900 and 4999 (Regulated Utilities), and firms smaller than $100
million in assets. Firms for which we could not confirm a transaction through Lexis-Nexis corresponding to
the decrease in segments are labeled Restructuring Events. Firms for which we could identify a
corresponding transaction are labeled Divestitures. Panel A presents the yearly distribution of the sample of
firms.  Panel B presents a frequency distribution of the number of segments within each firm that
disappeared during the event year.
Panel A: Yearly Distribution of Sample Firms
Restructuring Events Divestitures Total
Event Year Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
79 22 14.01% 9 5.36% 31 9.54%
80 13 8.28 11 6.55 24 7.38
81 17 10.83 21 12.50 38 11.69
82 19 12.10 12 7.14 31 9.54
83 9 5.73 9 5.36 18 5.54
84 16 10.19 18 10.71 34 10.46
85 9 5.73 14 8.33 23 7.08
86 13 8.28 14 8.33 27 8.31
87 4 2.55 11 6.55 15 4.62
88 6 3.82 10 5.95 16 4.92
89 8 5.10 9 5.36 17 5.23
90 2 1.27 5 2.98 7 2.15
91 8 5.10 9 5.36 17 5.23
92 2 1.27 5 2.98 7 2.15
93 6 3.82 6 3.57 12 3.69
94 3 1.91 5 2.98 8 2.46
Total 157 100% 168 100% 325 100%
Panel B: Decrease in Reported Segments
Decrease in Restructuring Events Divestitures Total
Segments Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
1 125 79.62% 142 84.52% 267 82.15%
2 24 15.29 22 13.10 46 14.15
3 5 3.18 4 2.38 9 2.77
4 1 0.64 1 0.31
5 2 1.27 2 0.62
Total 157 100% 168 100% 325 100%25
Table 2
Characteristics of firms that reduce the number of segments
Cells denote sample medians of firm performance variables and their benchmark values. Each benchmark
value is calculated as the mean value of the performance measure for a portfolio that consists of a minimum
of five firms in the same year, with the same number of segments, and in the same annual sales decile as
the sample firm. Benchmark firms cannot reduce the number of segments during the event year. Cash Flow
is defined as operating income before depreciation. The firm’s q is defined as the sum of the book value of
assets and the market value of equity net of the book value of equity over the book value of assets. Debt
divided by assets denotes the firm's total liabilities divided by assets. Cash includes inventories and is
normalized by assets. The coverage ratio is defined as EBIT plus depreciation divided by interest expense.
The coefficient of variation in q is reported times hundred. The diversification discount is calculated as in
Berger and Ofek (1995). The firm liquidity index is defined, as the size-based weighed average of the firm's
segment values for the liquidity index. The maximum liquidity is the maximum value for the liquidity
index within the firm for a divested/restructured segment. Panel B presents the difference between
restructuring events and divestitures. Statistical significance (p-values) of the median difference is based on
the Wilcoxon signed-rank-test under the null hypothesis of a median difference of zero and is denoted with
***, **, and * for 1, 5 and 10 percent rejection levels respectively.
Panel A: Full Sample
n Sample Benchmark Difference p-value
Size
Sales 280 6.476 6.573    -0.035 0.396
Market Value of Equity 284 12.474 12.542    -0.050* 0.085
Growth rates, investment, and growth opportunities
(Salest-1/Salest-2)-1 276 0.082 0.111    -0.027** 0.021
(Assets t-1/Assets t-2)-1 276 0.079 0.108    -0.038*** 0.002
(Cash Flowt-1/Cash Flowt-2)-1 260 0.070 0.138    -0.057*** 0.001
Cap. Expt-1/Salest-2 274 0.047 0.086    -0.038*** 0.000
(Cap. Exp t-1 /Cap. Exp t-2)-1 272 0.100 0.187    -0.078* 0.053
Diversification discount 160 -0.181 -0.099    -0.047* 0.077
q 275 1.059 1.208    -0.115*** 0.002
Coefficient of Variation in q 190 84.382 86.249    -2.226 0.859
Leverage
Debtt-1/Assets t-1 267 0.535 0.608    -0.074*** 0.001
Coverage Ratio 259 7.249 9.063    -1.503 0.373
Cash flow
Cash/Assets 267 0.031 0.062    -0.031*** 0.001
Net Incomet-1/Salest-2 276 0.042 0.048    -0.008*** 0.001
Cash Flowt-1/Salest-2 276 0.114 0.151    -0.034*** 0.001
Dividend yield 270 0.034 0.045    -0.016*** 0.001
Liquidity Measures
Liquidity Index 270 0.017 0.027    -0.003*** 0.001
Maximum Liquidity Index 270 0.031 0.056    -0.011*** 0.00126
Table 3
Characteristics of firms that restructure versus divest segments
Cells denote sample medians of firm performance variables and their benchmark values. Each benchmark value is calculated as the mean value of the
performance measure for a portfolio that consists of a minimum of five firms in the same year, with the same number of segments, and in the same annual sales
decile as the sample firm. Benchmark firms cannot reduce the number of segments during the event year. Cash Flow is defined as operating income before
depreciation. The firm’s q is defined as the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of equity net of the book value of equity over the book value of
assets. Debt divided by assets denotes the firm's total liabilities divided by assets. Cash includes inventories and is normalized by assets. The coverage ratio is
defined as EBIT plus depreciation divided by interest expense. The coefficient of variation in q is reported times hundred. The diversification discount is
calculated as in Berger and Ofek (1995). The firm liquidity index is defined, as the size-based weighed average of the firm's segment values for the liquidity
index. Segment Liquidity is calculated as the ratio of the value of corporate control actions within a year and 2-digit SIC class and the assets of all firms on
Compustat in the same year and 2-digit SIC class. The maximum liquidity is the maximum value for the liquidity index within the firm for a
divested/restructured segment. Panel B presents the difference between restructuring events and divestitures. Statistical significance of the median difference is
based on a Wilcoxon signed-rank-test and is denoted with ***, **, and * for 1, 5 and 10 percent rejection levels respectively.27
Table 3 - continued
Characteristics of firms that restructure versus divest segments
Restructuring Events versus Divestitures













(3) - (4) p-value (1) - (3) p-value
Size
Market Value of Equity 131 12.208 12.350  -0.092* 0.072 153 12.736 12.876  -0.056 0.294   -0.528* 0.070
Sales 125 6.316 6.517   0.034 0.890 155 6.686 6.649  -0.066* 0.097   -0.369 0.273
Growth rates, investment, and growth opportunities
(Sales t-1/Sales t-2)-1 123 0.102 0.124  -0.020 0.356 153 0.067 0.103  -0.032** 0.021    0.036 0.177
(Assets t-1/Assetst-2)-1 123 0.089 0.109  -0.036* 0.068 153 0.075 0.105  -0.046*** 0.004    0.014 0.539
Cap. Exp t-1/Salest-2 122 0.046 0.089  -0.046*** 0.000 152 0.050 0.084  -0.035*** 0.000   -0.004 0.324
(Cash Flowt-1/Cash Flowt-2)-1 116 0.099 0.151  -0.042 0.165 144 0.059 0.136  -0.056*** 0.001    0.039 0.206
(Cap. Exp t-1 /Cap. Exp t-2)-1 120 0.066 0.186  -0.156** 0.038 152 0.104 0.168  -0.053 0.296   -0.039 0.237
Diversification discount 69 -0.104 -0.088   0.036 0.946 91 -0.246 -0.108  -0.140** 0.016    0.142 0.128
q 124 1.037 1.171  -0.095** 0.018 151 1.089 1.243  -0.127** 0.023   -0.052 0.355
Coefficient of Variation in q 71 91.170 85.418   4.004 0.594 119 81.147 86.775  -3.022 0.419   10.023 0.287
Leverage
Debtt-1/Assetst-1 123 0.535 0.606  -0.065*** 0.001 144 0.540 0.611  -0.080*** 0.001   -0.005 0.947
Coverage Ratio 119 7.176 9.191  -1.623 0.410 140 7.320 8.920  -1.410 0.646    0.396 0.752
Cash flow and liquidity
Cash 123 0.029 0.062  -0.033*** 0.001 144 0.031 0.063  -0.030*** 0.001   -0.002 0.947
Net Income t-1/Sales t-2 123 0.043 0.051  -0.009** 0.041 153 0.038 0.046  -0.007** 0.011    0.005 0.713
Cash Flowt-1/Salest-2 123 0.121 0.151  -0.035*** 0.000 153 0.111 0.150  -0.034*** 0.000    0.010 0.713
Dividend yield 125 0.035 0.050  -0.018*** 0.000 145 0.031 0.041  -0.010** 0.031    0.004 0.715
Liquidity Measures
Liquidity Index 125 0.013 0.024  -0.003*** 0.001 145 0.020 0.029  -0.002 0.160   -0.011* 0.068
Maximum Liquidity Index 125 0.025 0.049  -0.011*** 0.001 145 0.035 0.063  -0.013*** 0.001   -0.012 0.27328
Table 4
Logit Regressions predicting whether a firm divests or restructures
Logit regressions with a binary dependent variable that takes on the value zero for a restructuring event and one for a divestiture. Cells denote respectively the
coefficient, p-value and the slope (defined as x ¶ ¶ ] E[ y , for the binary model y(0,1)=b b'x+e, evaluated at the mean of x), the pseudo-R
2, and the value of -2 times
the log likelihood. Cash Flow (CF) is defined as operating income before depreciation. Capital Expenditures (CPX) denote the firm's net capital expenditures.
The Coverage Ratio is defined as EBIT plus depreciation divided by interest expense. Excess Value is calculated as in Berger and Ofek (1995). The firm liquidity
index is defined, as the size-based weighed average of the firm's segment values for the liquidity index. Segment Liquidity is calculated as the ratio of the value
of corporate control actions within a year and 2-digit SIC class and the assets of all firms on Compustat in the same year and 2-digit SIC class. The maximum
liquidity is the maximum value for the liquidity index within the firm for a divested/restructured segment. Accounting numbers are based on the firm-level data,
and the numerator in the ratios is measured in year (-1) and the denominator in year (-2). Statistical significance is denoted with ***,**, and * for 1, 5 and 10
percent rejection levels respectively.
Model Intercept CF/Sales CPX/Sales Coverage Ratio Excess Value Max Liquidity Firm Liquidity
(1) 0.220 -4.437 4.672 0.028 -0.053
0.566 0.202 0.251 0.186 0.894
-1.092 1.150 0.007 -0.013
Pseudo-R
2 = 1.51% -2 log likelihood = 197.2
(2) -0.326 -4.130 4.620 0.032 -0.006        19.746**
0.455 0.245 0.260 0.138 0.988 0.011
-1.002 1.121 0.008 -0.002 4.790
Pseudo-R
2 = 5.29% -2 log likelihood = 189.6
(3) -0.579 -3.253 4.356 0.035 -0.035        15.440***
0.208 0.370 0.289 0.106 0.935 0.002
-0.768 1.028 0.008 -0.008 3.645
Pseudo-R
2 = 7.75% -2 log likelihood = 184.729
Table 5
Univariate Analysis for Divested and Restructured Segments versus Retained Segments
Cells represent median values of performance of divestitures and restructuring events' divested and retained segments. Segment accounting data is taken from the
Compustat CISF Full-Coverage Segment File. The size<10% dummy is equal to one if the segment sales are less than 10% of the firm's total sales and zero
otherwise. Cash flow (CF) is defined as operating profits plus depreciation. Tsales denotes the aggregated sales for the firm. Capital Expenditures (CPX) is
defined as net capital expenditures (i.e., gross capital expenditures minus depreciation). Segment Median Industry q is calculated as the fraction of the book value
of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity and the book value of total assets of all Compustat firms with the same 2-digit SIC
code as the segment. Segment Liquidity is calculated as the ratio of the value of corporate control actions within a year and 2-digit SIC class and the assets of all
firms on Compustat in the same year and 2-digit SIC class. The difference in q is between divested (restructured) non-core segments and all retained segments.
The change in the coefficient of variation in Tobin's q (DCoefficient of Variation in q) is denoted in percent change. The t subscript refers to the year relative to
the focusing year t.  Ratios are truncated at minus and plus one, growth variables at -100 and +200 percent. Asset and sales numbers are in $ millions. Statistical
significance of the difference in medians is denoted with ***,**, and * for 1, 5 and 10 percent rejection levels respectively.30
Table 5 - continued
Univariate Analysis for Divested and Restructured Segments versus Retained Segments
Divestiture Restructuring Event Divestiture - Restructuring Event
Divested Retained Difference Restructured Retained Difference
Divested
(Restructured) p-value Retained
(1) (2) (1) - (2) p-value (3) (4) (3) - (4) p-value (1) - (3) (2) - (4) p-value
Size
ln (Sales)t-1 4.621 5.452    -0.831*** 0.001 4.817 5.245     -0.428*** 0.001      -0.196 0.436       0.207 0.344
ln (Assets)t-1 4.240 5.158    -0.918*** 0.001 4.312 4.780     -0.468*** 0.005      -0.072 0.430       0.378 0.103
Mean Size<10% dummy 0.516 0.199     0.317 - 0.344 0.208      0.136 -       0.172 -      -0.009 -
Growth rates, investment, and growth opportunities
(Sales t-1 / Sales t-2) - 1 0.016 0.047    -0.031 0.163 0.021 0.064     -0.043** 0.022      -0.005 0.911      -0.017 0.262
(Sales t-1 / Tsalest-2) - 1 0.097 0.231    -0.134*** 0.001 0.146 0.202     -0.056* 0.056      -0.049*** 0.003       0.028 0.344
(Sales t-2  / Tsalest-3) - 1 0.107 0.223    -0.116*** 0.001 0.156 0.191     -0.035 0.212      -0.049** 0.016       0.032 0.466
((Sales/Tsales)t-1 / (Sales/Tsales)t-2) - 1 -0.030 0.003    -0.033** 0.014 -0.017 0.020     -0.037** 0.012      -0.013 0.150      -0.017 0.366
((Sales/Tsales)t-2 / (Sales/Tsales)t-3) - 1 -0.033 -0.007    -0.026 0.198 -0.015 0.004     -0.019 0.141      -0.018 0.284      -0.012 0.425
Net CPXt-1 / Salest-2 0.027 0.040    -0.013*** 0.006 0.036 0.039     -0.003 0.652      -0.009*** 0.008       0.001 0.852
Net CPXt-2 / Salest-3 0.032 0.042    -0.010** 0.022 0.038 0.039     -0.001 0.405      -0.006 0.151       0.002 0.584
(CPXt-1 / CPXt-2) - 1 -0.150 -0.016    -0.134** 0.022 -0.003 0.060     -0.063 0279      -0.147* 0.056      -0.076 0.167
(CPXt-2 / CPXt-3) - 1 0.056 0.014     0.042 0.658 0.029 0.010      0.019 0.908       0.027 0.618       0.005 0.762
Segment Median Industry q 1.156 1.269    -0.113** 0.024 1.197 1.199     -0.002 0.909      -0.041 0.737       0.070* 0.065
DCoefficient of Variation in q  (·100%) -0.151 -0.171     0.020 0.709 -0.186 -0.106     -0.080 0.176       0.035 0.686      -0.065 0.413
Cash flow
CFt-1 / Salest-2 0.071 0.122    -0.051*** 0.001 0.100 0.113     -0.013* 0.088      -0.029** 0.011       0.009 0.441
CFt-2 / Salest-3 0.097 0.131    -0.034*** 0.001 0.112 0.122     -0.010 0.305      -0.015* 0.082       0.009 0.152
Liquidity measures
Segment Liquidity 0.024 0.016     0.008** 0.018 0.020 0.017      0.003 0.380       0.004* 0.067      -0.001 0.978
Segment Liquidity (Core Segments) 0.021 0.016     0.005 0.663 0.021 0.019      0.002 0.657       0.000 0.999      -0.003 0.634
Segment Liquidity  (Non-core Segments) 0.026 0.016     0.100** 0.014 0.020 0.016      0.004 0.425       0.006* 0.086       0.000 0.99931
Table 6
Univariate Analysis for Industry-Adjusted Segment Performance
Cells represent median values of industry-adjusted performance of divestitures and restructuring events'
divested and retained segments. Segment accounting data is taken from the Compustat CISF Full-Coverage
Segment File. Cash flow (CF) is defined as operating profits plus depreciation.  Tsales denotes the
aggregated sales for the firm. Capital Expenditures (CPX) is defined as net capital expenditures (i.e., gross
capital expenditures minus depreciation). Industry-adjustments are based on the difference between the
variable and the median value of all Compustat firms with the same 2-digit SIC code in the fiscal year
before the focusing.  Ratios are truncated at minus and plus one and capital expenditures growth at minus
and plus two hundred percent. Asset and sales numbers are in $ millions. Statistical significance of the
difference in medians is denoted with ***,**, and * for 1, 5 and 10 percent rejection levels respectively.
Divested (Restructured)
Segments Retained Segments Difference
Variable Event n median p-value n median p-value Median p-value
CF / Sales Divestiture 120  -0.017*** 0.001 290   0.024*** 0.001  -0.042*** 0.001
Restructuring 231   0.013*** 0.009 113   0.027*** 0.000  -0.014 0.136
Difference  -0.030*** 0.008  -0.002 0.716
CPX / Sales Divestiture 118  -0.024** 0.030 289  -0.016*** 0.001  -0.008*** 0.005
Restructuring 230  -0.016*** 0.001 115  -0.019*** 0.001   0.003 0.761
Difference  -0.008** 0.013   0.003 0.741
CPX growth Divestiture 113  -0.228*** 0.001 276  -0.082 0.227  -0.145** 0.037
Restructuring 220  -0.102 0.181 108  -0.047 0.782  -0.055 0.482
Difference  -0.126* 0.054  -0.035 0.496
ln (Sales) Divestiture 119   0.707*** 0.001 290   1.219*** 0.001  -0.512*** 0.002
Restructuring 231   0.739*** 0.001 115   1.027*** 0.000  -0.288* 0.087
Difference  -0.032 0.910   0.192 0.337
Sales growth Divestiture 119  -0.060*** 0.001 289  -0.022*** 0.003  -0.037** 0.012
Restructuring 231  -0.062*** 0.001 114  -0.028 0.108  -0.034* 0.062
Difference   0.002 0.910   0.006 0.52832
Table 7
Relative Ranking of Within Firm Performance of Divested and Restructured Segments
Cells denote the number of restructured (R) and divested [D] segments within a ranking for different variables. The Number of Divisions denote the total number of
segments within a firm and the rank denotes the relative magnitude, from low to high, of the variable. Cash flow (CF) is defined as operating profits plus
depreciation. Capital Expenditures (CPX) is defined as net capital expenditures (i.e., gross capital expenditures minus depreciation). Segment q is calculated as the
fraction of the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity and the book value of total assets of all Compustat firms with
the same 2-digit SIC code as the segment.  Segment Liquidity is calculated as the ratio of the value of all corporate control actions within a year and 2-digit SIC class
and the assets of all firms on Compustat in the same year and 2-digit SIC class. The last row denotes the total number of divested segments, n, for each firm. Ties are
assigned to the higher rank. The last column denotes the Pearson c
2 test-statistic for restructuring events (R) and divestitures [D].  Significance is denoted with
***,**, and * for 1, 5 and 10 percent rejection levels and indicates rejection of equality of the variation across the rankings.
Number of Segments within Firm Pearson c
2
2 3 4 5 6 7 test-statistic
Variable Rank R D R D R D R D R D R D R [D]
CF/Sales 1 (low) 19 9 17 17 19 14 9 5 7 3 4 1    20.54
2 19 5 13 7 13 9 3 8 8 9 2 1   [39.15]*
3 10 6 13 7 10 4 4 1 4 0
4 11 6 5 3 7 3 3 1
5 5 3 7 1 3 0
6 5 0 3 0
7 (high) 2 0
ln(Sales) 1 (low) 21 13 17 21 20 20 7 6 5 6 5 0   28.60
2 17 1 13 7 13 10 8 8 8 4 3 2  [72.65]***
3 10 2 11 5 5 4 7 2 4 0
4 12 1 5 4 8 1 3 1
5 7 1 6 2 2 0
6 4 2 1 0
7 (high) 3 0
CPX/Sales 1 (low) 19 11 18 11 11 10 6 5 6 4 4 2   15.14
2 19 3 12 8 16 10 8 6 7 4 3 1  [22.15]
3 10 10 16 6 6 7 8 2 3 0
4 12 9 8 3 5 4 4 0
5 4 3 7 3 2 0
6 5 0 2 0
7 (high) 3 0
n 38 14 40 30 56 36 32 24 38 17 21 333
Table 7
Relative Ranking of Within Firm Performance of Divested and Restructured Segments - continued
Number of Segments within Firm Pearson c
2
2 3 4 5 6 7 test-statistic
Variable Rank R D R D R D R D R D R D R [D]
CPX 1 (low) 19 8 14 13 12 13 7 3 8 4 5 0     12.68
Growth 2 18 6 15 5 15 6 8 7 6 5 2 2    [28.10]
3 5 7 13 10 6 5 5 2 2 0
4 13 4 4 4 6 4 3 0
5 6 5 6 1 2 1
6 7 0 2 0
7 (high) 5 0
Segment q 1 (low) 13 5 10 12 9 8 5 6 4 2 2 0    40.23*
2 25 9 9 8 7 7 6 7 6 1 3 0   [23.09]
3 21 10 18 8 2 0 1 4 1 1
4 22 11 14 2 9 2 0 0
5 5 8 11 5 2 0
6 7 3 8 0
7 (high) 3 0
Segment 1 (low) 13 1 9 5 12 4 3 2 4 1 0 0    58.71***
Liquidity 2 24 11 11 4 4 6 5 3 4 1 1 0   [66.73]***
3 19 18 16 14 2 1 5 1 2 0
4 24 9 10 7 9 0 3 0
5 12 9 10 3 2 0
6 6 8 9 1
7 (high) 2 2
n 38 14 40 30 56 36 32 24 38 17 21 334
Table 8
Retained versus Divested and Restructured Segments Logit Regression Results
Logit regressions with a binary dependent variable that takes on the value one for divested (models (1D), (2D), and (3D)) and restructured (models (1R), (2R), and
(3R)) segments and zero for retained segments. Cells denote respectively the coefficient,  p-value and the slope (defined as  x ¶ ¶ ] E[ y , for the binary model
y(0,1)=b b'x+e, evaluated at the mean of x), the pseudo-R
2, and the value of -2 times the log likelihood. Cash Flow (CF) is defined as operating income before
depreciation. Capital Expenditures (CPX) denote the firm's net capital expenditures. Industry median variables are calculated as the median value of all Compustat
firms within the same 2-digit SIC code as the segment during the same year. The Non-core Dummy takes on a value of one when the 2-digit segment SIC code is
different from the 2-digit firm SIC code. Segment Liquidity is calculated as the ratio of the value of all corporate control actions within a year and 2-digit SIC class
and the assets of all firms on Compustat in the same year and 2-digit SIC class. The size<10% dummy is equal to one if the segment sales are less than 10% of the
firm's total sales and zero otherwise. Accounting numbers are based on the firm-level data, and the numerator in the ratios is measured in year ( -1) and the














(1D)    -0.192 -2.279**   -0.667      -4.993***     0.503*     -0.047     6.518**
    0.770  0.048    0.654       0.001     0.075      0.912     0.012
-0.381   -0.112      -0.835     0.084     -0.008     1.091
Pseudo-R
2 =  16.11% -2 log likelihood = 393.6
(1R)     1.442**  0.180   -2.605*      -0.909*    -0.128     -0.225     0.289
    0.019  0.839    0.051       0.094     0.631      0.613     0.891
 0.040   -0.572      -0.200    -0.028     -0.049     0.063
Pseudo-R
2 = 1.78% -2 log likelihood = 433.9
(2D)    -0.384 -2.436**     0.114   -0.967   3.975      -4.942***     0.490*     -0.073     6.641**
    0.580  0.046     0.969    0.539   0.541       0.001     0.085      0.865     0.011
-0.408     0.019   -0.162   0.666      -0.828     0.082     -0.012     1.112
Pseudo-R
2 = 16.22% -2 log likelihood = 393.1
(2R)     2.033***  0.395    -0.649   -1.509 -10.310*      -0.964*    -0.105     -0.229     0.347
    0.004  0.665     0.864    0.313    0.079       0.079     0.695      0.611     0.869
 0.087    -0.143   -0.333   -2.272      -0.212    -0.023     -0.051     0.076
Pseudo-R
2 =  2.81% -2 log likelihood = 429.3
(3D)    -0.631 -2.366*     0.040   -1.073   3.857      -4.344***     0.517*     -0.024     6.317**      0.246
    0.414  0.053     0.989    0.497   0.553       0.001     0.073      0.957     0.017      0.472
-0.403     0.007   -0.183   0.657      -0.740     0.088     -0.004     1.076      0.042
Pseudo-R
2 = 16.85 % -2 log likelihood = 383.2
(3R)     1.442**  0.635    -1.268   -1.581 -10.270*      -0.069    -0.026     -0.150     0.491      0.989***
    0.049  0.496     0.742    0.290    0.082       0.913     0.925      0.743     0.815      0.003
 0.138    -0.275   -0.343   -2.229      -0.015    -0.006     -0.033     0.107      0.215
Pseudo-R
2 =  5.35% -2 log likelihood = 398.6